A single line often inverts meaning once you see what it
answers, so neighbouring messages are always shown.
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t proportion of bat viruses that are carnivore/human transmissible e number of exposures between bats and carnivores (over all locations, and over decades) p(h) probability of human infection per carnivore outbreak p(p) probability of pandemic arising per human infection p_zoonotic = t x e x p(h) x p(p) t is very small but e is very large For the lab scenario N = number of samples collected by the lab p(i) = probability a sample remains infectious p(l) = probability of a lab infection s = number of scientists handling material p_lab = t x N x p(i) x (1 - [1 - p(l)] ^ s) x p(p) In this one, t is very small, all of the p() are < 1 and N is not that big
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Brilliant! Math>>>Figure
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I forgot to add in p(f) = probability that WIV is fibbing
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Love it @Andrew Rambaut - and yes, this is what we need. For the ones above e >>> N and p(i) is also very low - probably ~1%. p(l) can be calibrated based on previous lab escapes and is also low - much less than 1%, but let's keep it at that. p(h) we can calibrate based on sero surveys, using a one year seroreversion - so 2% ofpopulation in certain areas.
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2021-05-10 09:12
Kristian G. Andersen
According to The Seeker, nobody in their right mind would consider p(f) > 0.... :wink:
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Worth plotting some of this out?
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p(h) may be close to 1 - if there is an outbreak in a farmed carnivore population.
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Yeah, p(h) definitely high - p(p I h) specifically for SARS-CoV-2 also high because of the features of the virus.
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Here's Jim's email - note the sly comments from Relman. Unsurprising (and not something I'll comment on - if he wants to specify exactly what's unsupported in our letter, I'm happy to address it. Usual bs). [shared file(s): lab investigation letter]