Slack / Private Message Drop — page 768

p(h) probability of human infection per carnivore outbreak p(p) probability of pandemic arising per human infection p_zoonotic = t x e x p(h) x p(p) t is very small but e is very large For the lab scenario N = number of samples collected by the lab p(i) = probability a sample remains infectious p(l) = probability of a lab infection s = number of scientists handling material p_lab = t x N x p(i) x (1 - [1 - p(l)] ^ s) x p(p) In this one, t is very small, all of the p() are < 1 and N is not that big [2021-05-10 09:05:48] [Robert Garry] Brilliant! Math>>>Figure [2021-05-10 09:10:48] [Andrew Rambaut] I forgot to add in p(f) = probability that WIV is fibbing [2021-05-10 09:12:02] [Kristian Andersen] Love it @Andrew Rambaut - and yes, this is what we need. For the ones above e >>> N and p(i) is also very low - probably ~1%. p(l) can be calibrated based on previous lab escapes and is also low - much less than 1%, but let's keep it at that. p(h) we can calibrate based on sero surveys, using a one year seroreversion - so 2% of population in certain areas. [2021-05-10 09:12:39] [Kristian Andersen] According to The Seeker, nobody in their right mind would consider p(f) > 0.... :wink: [2021-05-10 09:13:27] [Kristian Andersen] Worth plotting some of this out? [2021-05-10 09:13:53] [Andrew Rambaut] p(h) may be close to 1 - if there is an outbreak in a farmed carnivore population. [2021-05-10 09:15:34] [Kristian Andersen] Yeah, p(h) definitely high - p(p I h) specifically for SARS-CoV-2 also high because of the features of the virus. [2021-05-10 09:33:42] [Kristian Andersen] Here's Jim's email - note the sly comments from Relman. Unsurprising (and not something I'll comment on - if he wants to specify exactly what's unsupported in our letter, I'm happy to address it. Usual bs). [shared file(s): lab investigation letter] [2021-05-10 09:52:43]