COVID-19 Records

Ashley Sanders

Engagement

Authored10
Substantive (25+ words)10
Threads posted in2
Distinct active days7
Words authored4,100
Received (incl. group broadcast)8

Received counts include every message sent to a channel this person belonged to. That measures presence, not participation.

Statements

  • 10 own voice
  • 1 need context
  • 27 quoted / not their view

38 sentences were extracted and attributed to this person. Most are not their own opinion. Reporting the total as “38 statements” would misrepresent them.

Correspondents

PersonMediumMsgsSpan
Emily Linde email 90 2020-05-13 – 2020-09-10
Mike Shannon email 56 2020-05-13 – 2020-09-10
Erik Stemmy email 38 2020-05-21 – 2020-05-22
Deborah Kearse email 14 2020-09-09 – 2020-09-10
David A Miller email 4 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Michael Lauer email 4 2020-09-11 – 2020-09-11
Deborah email 1 2020-09-11 – 2020-09-11
Deborah email 1 2020-09-11 – 2020-09-11
Emily email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Emily email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Erik email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Erik email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Erik email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Erik email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Erik email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Erik email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Kearse email 1 2020-09-11 – 2020-09-11
Kearse email 1 2020-09-11 – 2020-09-11
Linde email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Linde email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Mike email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Mike email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Mike email 1 2020-09-11 – 2020-09-11
Mike email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22
Mike email 1 2020-05-22 – 2020-05-22

Topics

Appears in

Statement record

Showing: own voice, substantive needs context quoted / not their view all

2020-05-13 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
On page 192 of SF 424 AI110964-06 (received date 11/05/2018) under P3CO Research, it indicates they are conducting gain of function of SARSr-CoV.

Reading Room Production, p.13 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-13 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
From a review of their experimental details, it looks as if they were generating recombinant DNA of the viruses using WIV1 as the backbone but I could not determine if they were using Seemless Cloning techniques.

Reading Room Production, p.13 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-13 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
I could not determine exactly where they were conducting these gain of function experiments.

Reading Room Production, p.13 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-13 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
On page 119 of AI110964-01 under "C3d) Humanized mouse in vivo infection experiments" it states that humanized mouse in vivo experiments in humanized mice was occurring at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Reading Room Production, p.13 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-13 quoted / not their view quoted_external · questions · email
I did not see the location where these gain of function experiments were being done but if the injections were occurring at WIV then was the recombinant DNA also generated at WIV?

Reading Room Production, p.13 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-20 own voice, substantive speaker_own · asserts · email
Good afternoon, We are following up on a time-sensitive request for information from the FBI.

Reading Room Production, p.10 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
There may be some misunderstanding of gain-of-function experiments, so hopefully this will clarify some things or at least provide a framework for our discussion next week.

Reading Room Production, p.15 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
On page 192 of SF 424 AI110964-06 (received date 11/05/2018) under P3CO Research, it indicates they are conducting gain of function of SARSr-CoV.

Reading Room Production, p.15 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
The funding pause on gain-of-function (GoF) experiments was in place from 2014-2017, and explicitly involved work reasonably anticipated to enhance the transmissibility or pathogenicity of influenza, MERS-CoV, or SARS-CoV.

Reading Room Production, p.15 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
The replacement policy, Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO), requires additional review and oversight of experiments that are anticipated to increase a potential pandemic pathogen's transmissibility or pathogenicity in humans.

Reading Room Production, p.15 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
I could not determine exactly where they were conducting these gain of function experiments.

Reading Room Production, p.15 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
I believe UNC mean to say that the work "... does not include human research subjects." SF 424 AI110964-01 (received date 06/05/2013) In this SF 424 Aim 3 seems indicative of gain of function experimentation (C3a and C3b) although it does not use that exact term.

Reading Room Production, p.15 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
The receipt date of this application was June of 2013, and the term "gain-of-function" was not widely used before the USG funding pause was announced in 2014.

Reading Room Production, p.15 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 own voice, substantive speaker_own · asserts · email
On page 192 of SF 424 AI110964-06 (received date 11/05/2018) under P3CO Research, it indicates they are conducting gain of function of SARSr-CoV.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
The funding pause on gain-of-function (GoF) experiments was in place from 2014-2017, and explicitly involved work reasonably anticipated to enhance the transmissibility or pathogenicity of influenza, MERS-CoV, or SARS-CoV.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 own voice, substantive speaker_own · asserts · email
The replacement policy, Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO), requires additional review and oversight of experiments that are anticipated to increase a potential pandemic pathogen's transmissibility or pathogenicity in humans.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 own voice, substantive speaker_own · asserts · email
From a review of their experimental details, it looks as if they were generating recombinant DNA of the viruses using WIV1 as the backbone but I could not determine if they were using Seemless Cloning techniques.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
I could not determine exactly where they were conducting these gain of function experiments.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
This award did not support work to manipulate CoV genomes or create chimeric viruses at Wuhan Institute of Virology; such work was performed at UNC-CH.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
I believe UNC mean to say that the work "... does not include human research subjects." SF 424 AI110964-01 (received date 06/05/2013) In this SF 424 Aim 3 seems indicative of gain of function experimentation (C3a and C3b) although it does not use that exact term.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
The receipt date of this application was June of 2013, and the term "gain-of-function" was not widely used before the USG funding pause was announced in 2014.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
On page 119 of AI110964-01 under "C3d) Humanized mouse in vivo infection experiments" it states that humanized mouse in vivo experiments in humanized mice was occurring at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 needs context speaker_own · questions · email
I did not see the location where these gain of function experiments were being done but if the injections were occurring at WIV then was the recombinant DNA also generated at WIV?

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
Further, the USG P3CO Policy Guidance states that "Wild-type pathogens that are circulating in or have been recovered from nature are not enhanced PPPs, regardless of their pandemic potential." RPPR (AI110964-05) Finally, in the RPPR (6/1/2017-5/31/2018) on page 28 under "In Vivo Infection of Human ACE2 Expressing Mice with SARSr-Cov S Protein variants", it appears to be showing the results from their gain of function experiments as described in the SF 424.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
The figure you reference (Fig 35) shows weight loss and lung viral titers of chimeric viruses with bat CoV (wild type WIV-1, SHC014, WIV16, and 4231) spike proteins expressed on the WIV-1 backbone.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 own voice, substantive speaker_own · asserts · email
There may be some misunderstanding of gain-of-function experiments, so hopefully this will clarify some things or at least provide a framework for our discussion next week.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 own voice, substantive speaker_own · asserts · email
On page 192 of SF 424 AI110964-06 (received date 11/05/2018) under P3CO Research, it indicates they are conducting gain of function of SARSr-CoV.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
The funding pause on gain-of-function (GoF) experiments was in place from 2014-2017, and explicitly involved work reasonably anticipated to enhance the transmissibility or pathogenicity of influenza, MERS-CoV, or SARS-CoV.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-05-22 own voice, substantive speaker_own · asserts · email
The replacement policy, Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO), requires additional review and oversight of experiments that are anticipated to increase a potential pandemic pathogen's transmissibility or pathogenicity in humans.

Reading Room Production, p.5 · original PDF · in context

2020-09-09 quoted / not their view quoted_external · acknowledges · email
In a recent discussion with HHS OIG and the FBI, they noted they received information that the below-grant with Ecohealth Alliance was "suspended" or "terminated".

Reading Room Production, p.32 · original PDF · in context

2020-09-09 quoted / not their view quoted_external · questions · email
What was the reasoning for NIAID ending the grant and/or collaboration with Ecohealth Alliance? 3.

Reading Room Production, p.32 · original PDF · in context

2020-09-09 quoted / not their view quoted_external · acknowledges · email
In a recent discussion with HHS OIG and the FBI, they noted they received information that the below-grant with Ecohealth Alliance was "suspended" or "terminated".

Reading Room Production, p.44 · original PDF · in context

2020-09-09 quoted / not their view quoted_external · questions · email
What was the reasoning for NIAID ending the grant and/or collaboration with Ecohealth Alliance? 3.

Reading Room Production, p.44 · original PDF · in context

2020-09-10 own voice, substantive speaker_own · asserts · email
/O) cE /0)) cE) as /0)) (] as Cc: Shannon, Mike (NIH/OD) [E] @nih.gov>; Kearse, Deborah (NIH/OD) [E] @nih.gov> Subject: RE: Grant Questions - FBI Inquiry - 1-R01AI110964-01 - 2-R01AI110964-06 Importance: High Hi Emily, These questions are specific to whether or not this particular NIAID grant was terminated early or ended as per a usual course of action.

Reading Room Production, p.24 · original PDF · in context

2020-09-10 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
OMA properly and routinely seeks and receives information from IC's on grants and grant activity in support of audits and investigations, in accordance with Manual Chapter 1754 and 1752, as we are responsible to fully coordinate responses to OIG/FBI/DOJ etc. to support ongoing investigations.

Reading Room Production, p.24 · original PDF · in context

2020-09-10 quoted / not their view quoted_external · asserts · email
OMA properly and routinely seeks and receives information from IC's on grants and grant activity in support of audits and investigations, in accordance with Manual Chapter 1754 and 1752, as we are responsible to fully coordinate responses to OIG/FBI/DOJ etc. to support ongoing investigations.

Reading Room Production, p.32 · original PDF · in context

2020-09-11 own voice, substantive speaker_own · asserts · email
Lauer, We are following-up on an ongoing case related to the above-captioned grant with NIAID awarded to Ecohealth Alliance.

Reading Room Production, p.39 · original PDF · in context

2020-09-11 own voice, substantive speaker_own · asserts · email
OIG has now joined FBI on a broader-scope investigation and have asked for clarity on the closure/termination of this grant.

Reading Room Production, p.39 · original PDF · in context