| Authored | 5 |
| Substantive (25+ words) | 5 |
| Threads posted in | 2 |
| Distinct active days | 3 |
| Words authored | 3,408 |
| Received (incl. group broadcast) | 0 |
Received counts include every message sent to a channel this person belonged to. That measures presence, not participation.
21 sentences were extracted and attributed to this person. Most are not their own opinion. Reporting the total as “21 statements” would misrepresent them.
| Person | Medium | Msgs | Span |
|---|---|---|---|
| Robert Eiss | 14 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-10-11 | |
| Michael Nealy | 10 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-09-30 | |
| Courtney Billet | 9 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-09-30 | |
| Emily Erbelding | 9 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-09-30 | |
| Hugh Auchincloss | 9 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-09-30 | |
| Jill Harper | 9 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-09-30 | |
| Marie Parker | 9 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-09-30 | |
| Christopher Hanson | 8 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-09-30 | |
| Ddsm Correspondences | 8 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-09-30 | |
| Kelly Poe | 8 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-09-30 | |
| Sharon Gilles | 8 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-09-30 | |
| Steven Holland | 8 | 2024-09-25 – 2024-09-30 |
Showing: own voice, substantive needs context quoted / not their view all
This morning, the attached version of the bill was reported out of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) and now awaits further Senate consideration.
Reading Room Production, p.141 · original PDF · in context
This morning, the attached version of the bill was reported out of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) and now awaits further Senate consideration.
Reading Room Production, p.167 · original PDF · in context
Thanks, Chase NIAID NIAID notes that, to avoid confusion, the definitions in the bill pertaining to scientific and/or current policies should be consistent with definitions in science and those policies, including the USG Policy for Oversight of DURC and PEPP (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/USG-Policy-for-Oversight-of-DURC-andPEPP.pdf).
Reading Room Production, p.137 · original PDF · in context
ORS Concern over the confusion and differences between agent listing, some definition and intent of this as compared to the new DURC PEPP policy and also the current/ transparent process by which select agents are added or removed.
Reading Room Production, p.137 · original PDF · in context
We would recommend alignment 100% in line with the current SA policies and DURC PEPP policies.
Reading Room Production, p.137 · original PDF · in context
We have significant concerns about this bill and approach this would take for the oversight of biological research.
Reading Room Production, p.137 · original PDF · in context
OSP Topline points: · While some aspects of this bill related to scope are improved, there continue to be significant concerns about the impact on biomedical research. · Strengthening biosafety and biosecurity oversight of life sciences research is a key priority of this Administration, as outlined in the National Biodefense Strategy.
Reading Room Production, p.137 · original PDF · in context
We believe the bill as drafted would significantly undermine life sciences research, and its oversight provisions fail to target the subset of research posing greatest risk.
Reading Room Production, p.137 · original PDF · in context
As such, we do not support this legislation. · The Administration has recently strengthened, streamlined, and expanded oversight of potentially high risk life science research in the May 2024 United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential ("DURC/PEPP policy").
Reading Room Production, p.137 · original PDF · in context
Some of our concerns with the bill are: · Scope: While steps have been made toward harmonization of the scope of the Board's oversight with the new United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (2024 OSTP DURC/PEPP Policy), some of the listed experiments in the "dual use research of concern" definition do not match those in the policy, and other articulated in-scope research in the bill including the "gain of function research" term continues to be in conflict with USG policy.
Reading Room Production, p.137 · original PDF · in context
Thanks, Chase NIAID NIAID notes that, to avoid confusion, the definitions in the bill pertaining to scientific and/or current policies should be consistent with definitions in science and those policies, including the USG Policy for Oversight of DURC and PEPP (https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/USG-Policy-for-Oversight-of-DURC-andPEPP.pdf).
Reading Room Production, p.164 · original PDF · in context
ORS Concern over the confusion and differences between agent listing, some definition and intent of this as compared to the new DURC PEPP policy and also the current/ transparent process by which select agents are added or removed.
Reading Room Production, p.164 · original PDF · in context
We would recommend alignment 100% in line with the current SA policies and DURC PEPP policies.
Reading Room Production, p.164 · original PDF · in context
We have significant concerns about this bill and approach this would take for the oversight of biological research.
Reading Room Production, p.164 · original PDF · in context
Strengthening biosafety and biosecurity oversight of life sciences research is a key priority of this Administration, as outlined in the National Biodefense Strategy.
Reading Room Production, p.164 · original PDF · in context
We believe the bill as drafted would significantly undermine life sciences research, and its oversight provisions fail to target the subset of research posing greatest risk.
Reading Room Production, p.164 · original PDF · in context
The Administration has recently strengthened, streamlined, and expanded oversight of potentially high risk life science research in the May 2024 United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential ("DURC/PEPP policy").
Reading Room Production, p.164 · original PDF · in context
The bill seems to create redundancies with some reforms recently introduced by the DURC/PEPP policy, which was developed following significant interagency discussions directed by Congress and informed by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, public comment, and other expert input.
Reading Room Production, p.164 · original PDF · in context
For example, we would welcome discussions on how the risk-based oversight processes established in the DURC policy for federally funded research could be extended to non-federally funded research.
Reading Room Production, p.164 · original PDF · in context
We recognize that biosafety and biosecurity oversight responsibilities are currently shared across many different departments and agencies and welcome discussions on appropriate entities for oversight of the highest risk research.
Reading Room Production, p.164 · original PDF · in context
Some of our concerns with the bill are: Scope: While steps have been made toward harmonization of the scope of the Board's oversight with the new United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (2024 OSTP DURC/PEPP Policy), some of the listed experiments in the "dual use research of concern" definition do not match those in the policy, and other articulated in-scope research in the bill including the "gain of function research" term continues to be in conflict with USG policy.
Reading Room Production, p.164 · original PDF · in context