Transcript segment

Baric Transcribed Interview (Redacted), pp.67-68 · baric_ti:utt:00574

Date: 2026-04-10 09:00 (day precision)
Type: transcript segment · interview
recipient: Christina Salazar, Harry Kazenoff, David T. Lambeth III, William Henderson, Clark Ervin, Jake Greenberg
speaker: Ralph S. Baric
Topics: Biosafety and biosecurity Lab-leak / accidental release hypothesis

I never ruled out lab leak possibility. I don't see how anyone can. And the reason that is, is that they've published papers saying that they did their work at BSL-2. Biological Safety Level 2 is less stringent than Biological Safety Level 3. So there are many more laboratory-acquired infections at BSL-2 than at BSL-3. And so if you're working with viruses than use human receptors and growing human cells, and you're doing it at BSL-2, you DC.Scheduling@LexitasLegal.com cannot ever conclusively say that there was not a laboratory leak.

Extracted statements

Rule-extracted, not adjudicated. The grade says what may be done with each one; read the document above before relying on any of them.

Statement	Grade	Attribution	Stance
And the reason that is, is that they've published papers saying that they did their work at BSL-2.	own voice, substantive	speaker_own	asserts
So there are many more laboratory-acquired infections at BSL-2 than at BSL-3.	own voice, substantive	speaker_own	asserts
And so if you're working with viruses than use human receptors and growing human cells, and you're doing it at BSL-2, you DC.Scheduling@LexitasLegal.com cannot ever conclusively say that there was not a laboratory leak.	own voice, substantive	speaker_own	asserts

Statement

Grade

Attribution

Stance

And the reason that is, is that they've published papers saying that they did their work at BSL-2.

own voice, substantive

speaker_own

asserts

So there are many more laboratory-acquired infections at BSL-2 than at BSL-3.

own voice, substantive

speaker_own

asserts

And so if you're working with viruses than use human receptors and growing human cells, and you're doing it at BSL-2, you DC.Scheduling@LexitasLegal.com cannot ever conclusively say that there was not a laboratory leak.

own voice, substantive

speaker_own

asserts

In context

A single line often inverts meaning once you see what it answers, so neighbouring messages are always shown.

2026-04-10 09:00 Ralph S. Baric open

I would say it's more likely to be Peter Daszak.
2026-04-10 09:00 Christina Salazar open

Okay. So was that something that Peter Daszak expressed on the call?
2026-04-10 09:00 Ralph S. Baric open

I recall that people challenged the idea that it could be a lab leak.
2026-04-10 09:00 Christina Salazar open

But at that point you were not -- I think you've rated it as more likely natural, but you weren't -- what would you rate it?
2026-04-10 09:00 Ralph S. Baric

I never ruled out lab leak possibility. I don't see how anyone can. And the reason that is, is that they've published papers saying that they did their work at BSL-2. Biological Safety Level 2 is less stringent than Biological Safety Level 3. So there are many more laboratory-acquired infections at BSL-2 than at BSL-3. And so if you're working with viruses than use human receptors and growing human cells, and you're doing it at BSL-2, you DC.Scheduling@LexitasLegal.com cannot ever conclusively say that there was not a laboratory leak.
2026-04-10 09:00 Christina Salazar open

So you think that he was referring to Peter Daszak, so when he's saying, "I wonder if he, himself, is worried about this too."
2026-04-10 09:00 Ralph S. Baric open

I have absolutely no concerns about, no hesitation to tell you that I was not involved in the creation of this virus in any way. I'm 100 percent certain.
2026-04-10 09:00 Christina Salazar open

So that February 3rd call, what was the purpose of it?
2026-04-10 09:00 Ralph S. Baric open

I think the NIH had asked the National Academy to get together a group to put together a document about the COVID-19 virus.

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