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UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA Twin Cities Campus Driven to DiscoverTM Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy Academic Health Center School of Public Health Mayo Memorial Building 420 Delaware Street S.E. MMC 263, Room C315 Minneapolis, MN 55455 Office: 612-626-6770 Fax: 612-626-6783 www.cidrap.umn.edu April 12, 2012 Amy P. Patterson, M.D. Associate Director for Science Policy National Institutes of Health Office of Science Policy, OD, NIH Building 1, Room 103 9000 Rockville Pike Bethesda, MD 20892 Dear Amy, We all realize that the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) is currently in "uncharted scientific and public policy waters" with the request by the United States Government (USG) to review and make recommendations regarding publication of manuscripts from Dr. Ron Fouchier and colleagues and Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka and colleagues reporting their respective research methods and results related to the transmissibility of H5N1 in mammals. As a member of the NSABB, I appreciate the extensive efforts by the Board over the past six months to provide this comprehensive review and to make recommendations based on the previous extensive work of the Board to define dual-use research of concern (DURC.) It has been a gratifying professional and personal experience for me to work with such a dedicated group of scientific and policy leaders with a common purpose of both enabling the ongoing critical life science research that provides answers to some our most challenging health and environmental issues and at the same time protecting the world from potential catastrophic outcomes resulting from similar research. It has been two weeks since the NSABB meeting of March 29-30 where the Board was requested by the USG to reconsider our previous decision recommending the redaction of both the above referenced manuscripts before publication. During this time I have given considerable thought to the way the meeting was conducted and the subsequent decision by the NSABB to change its recommendation to full publication of both manuscripts without redaction. While we all realize any effort by the NSABB members and staff to arrive at a "Solomon-like" decision regarding the dissemination of the methods and results included in these manuscripts will be questioned by those who do not agree with the outcome, there is also a critical consideration for establishing precedence for how the NSABB will move forward with similar complex issues in the future. It is for this reason I share this letter with the NSABB members and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA) staff that support the Board's work. The views in this letter are mine and mine alone; I have not communicated with members of the NSABB or staff since the meeting. I write this letter in the spirit of moving forward and with an understanding of how the recent events related to the H5N1 influenza manuscript review informs us on why the USG-NSABB process for evaluating DURC issues must fundamentally change to