Reading Room Production — page 377

both protect life science research and the risk to the public of such research. For the record, I voted at the meeting to approve the full publication of the Kawaoka manuscript and the continued requirement of redaction of the Fouchier manuscript. First, I believe that the agenda and speakers for the March 29 and 30th NSABB meeting as determined by the OBA staff and other USG officials was designed to produce the outcome that occurred. It represented a very "one sided" picture of the risk-benefit of the dissemination of the information in these manuscripts. The agenda was not designed to promote a balanced reconsideration of the manuscripts. While I don't suggest that there was a sinister motive by the USG with regard to either the agenda or invited speakers, I believe there was a bias toward finding a solution that was a lot less about a robust science- and policy-based risk-benefit analysis and more about how to get us out of this difficult situation. I also believe that this same approach in the future will mean all of us, including life science researchers, journal editors and government policy makers, will just continue to "kick the can down the road" without coming to grips with the very difficult task of managing DURC and the dissemination of potentially harmful information to those who might intentionally or unintentionally use that information in a way that risks public safety. Merely providing a "minority report" in the final findings and recommendations of the meeting does nothing to address the fundamental issues of how the risk and benefits were determined, described, and considered at the meeting. For example we heard from Dr. Fouchier that he has already identified an additional mutation (not included in his current manuscript) that results in ferret-to-ferret transmission (mammalian transmission) without the need for repeated passage of the virus in ferrets. This work, which may have been supported by NIH funds, surely must be considered as a candidate for the next manuscript to be before the NSABB for review. What scientific and policy issues will differ with this "incrementally changed manuscript" compared with the issues we just considered? If such work represents only incremental changes in results from previously approved work, will the Board ever find a bright line for redacting publication and all the issues that go with that decision? For you to better understand my concerns, I will detail specific examples of how I believe the agenda and selected speakers resulted in the one-sided risk-benefit analysis that I described above. I will use in part the general considerations and conclusions in the April 11th draft NSABB findings and recommendations document as the framework for these points. The data in the newly revised manuscripts are immediately and directly enabling. There was no objective review provided by a disinterested subject matter expert that addressed the current state of the art regarding the proliferation and use of reverse genetics technology that can incorporate the methods and results presented in the current manuscripts to allow those who would not have the ready expertise or resources to more easily repeat these experiments. The implications of doing such work, even by well-meaning scientists who do not have adequate biosafety measures in place, should have been reviewed. The subject matter experts that addressed this issue at the meeting have a real conflict of interest in that their laboratories are involved in this same type of work and the results of our deliberations directly affect them, too. The same can be said about the attendees and outcome of the February World Health Organization consultation. In short, it was the "involved influenza research community" telling us what they should and shouldn't be allowed to do based on their interested perspective. Such a