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Draft
Strategy for Reinventing the
Integrated Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise
The U.S. Government's Integrated Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise
(iPHEMCE) has struggled for almost a decade to develop drugs, diagnostics, and vaccines
("countermeasures") against naturally occurring pandemics and other infectious diseases, and
deliberately propagated bioterrorism and other public health threats. Despite significant investment,
our National efforts have yielded only a modest number of new countermeasures. We recognize
that our current approach is not sustainable over the long term, will not provide us with the
comprehensive protection we require against both known and emerging threats, and that recent
advances in the biological sciences and pharmaceutical industry create scientific opportunities that
must be pursued. (Excellent!
To reduce our vulnerability to public health threats and safeguard the health and safety of the
American people, we must pursue immediately a-very different approach to novel medical
countermeasures development and acquisition. To that end, and as announced during the
President's State of the Union address on January 27, 2010, the Obama Administration is launching
a transformative initiative. The goal is to develop a national capability for the rapid, reliable,
robust, and affordable production of an array of medical countermeasures against public health
threats. This document lays out the broad strategy to achieve this goal.
'Commented [a1]: I inserted the word "broad" to alleviate the
In creating a transformed iPHEMCE, it is useful to understand the obstacles that have limited its
success to date. In pursuing new biodefense countermeasures over the last eight years, the Federal
Government has experimented with a variety of "push" and "pull" incentives for the pharmaceutical
industry, a critical partner in the development of countermeasures. These incentives, including the
creation of a $5.6B Special Reserve Fund for Project BioShield, have not resulted in the desired
flow of new and next-generation medical countermeasures because they have not addressed the real
problem, which is the barriers that the pharmaceutical industry perceives to return on investment in
this area.
These barriers include:
'*
Complex, burdensome, and uncertain path to licensure of countermeasures;
Rapid and unpredictable pace of new requirements for novel countermeasures;
Small markets and/or low profit margins for the products the USG has indicated it requires:
High cost of drug development under any circumstances;
High costs associated with scale-up and manufacturing:
Limited in-house subject matter expertise:
Lack of expertise and experience in negotiating the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(EDA) "animal rule" pathway to product licensure:
©
Complex policy environment;
©
Complex funding environment; and
©
High risk of failure.
Afier assessing the high opportunity cost and financial risk of working in the domain of developing
countermeasures for bioterror threats, and considering the high transaction costs associated with
government contracts, capable large pharmaceutical firms have uniformly elected to focus their
ty that this is final and to
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2010-02-11 19:37:00
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Records on this page
| Record | Date | Type | Pages |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conference Call Today at 6pm | 2010-02-11 | 463–466 |