Reading Room Production — page 157
of 496 pages
← p.156 p.158 → · this page in the original PDF · package
HHS Review of S.4667 Risky Research Review Act
As amended by HSGAC on September 25, 2024
HHS appreciates the opportunity to review S. 4667, as amended by the Peters-Paul substitute
amendment. Please note this is not formal Department TA or Administrations views. However,
as there remain many similarities between the introduced bill and substitute amendment, we are
also attaching the formal TA we shared with the committee in July. to the introduced bill, for
reference.
While some aspects of this bill related to scope are improved, there continue to be significant
concerns about the impact on biomedical research.
Strengthening biosafety and biosecurity oversight of life sciences research is a key priority of
this Administration, as outlined in the National Biodefense Strategy. We believe the bill as
drafted would significantly undermine life sciences research, and its oversight provisions fail to
target the subset of research posing greatest risk.
As currently drafted, this legislation has the potential to negatively impact innovation and the
U.S. competitive edge in life sciences research, including our ability to attract and retain the best
scientists.
While HHS continues to have serious concerns with this legislation as drafted, we remain
committed to working with the Committee and Congress on biosafety and biosecurity.
More detailed concerns are described below by category.
Redundant with DURC/PEPP policy
•
The Administration has recently strengthened, streamlined, and expanded oversight of
potentially high risk life science research in the May 2024 United States Government
Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern Pathogens with Enhanced
Pandemic Potential ("DURC/PEPP policy"). This policy expands and strengthens a tiered
system of oversight for all federally funded research that includes a requirement for
research on pathogens with enhanced pandemic potential to undergo extra departmental
review. The policy also:
o
Defines an expanded scope of pathogen and toxin research subject to additional
oversight by the U.S. Government;
o
Provides a unified framework to support the consistent identification and
oversight of research proposals that require enhanced oversight that accounts for
safety, security, and ethical considerations; and
o
Delineates the roles and responsibilities of principal investigators, research
institutions, and Federal departments and agencies that conduct, fund, or oversee
research within the scope of the policy.
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Records on this page
| Record | Date | Type | Pages |
|---|---|---|---|
| URGENT ACTION by 12pm Friday 7/12: TA on Risky Research Review Act | 2024-07-11 | 155–158 |