April 13-23, 2013 - For the past several weeks there has been intense activity regarding
Diary Prequel Package, pp.284-285 · diary_prequel:entry:00752
Page text: p.284, p.285 · original PDF
- Date
- 2013-04-13 00:00 (day precision)
- Type
- diary entry · diary
- author
- Anthony S. Fauci
April 13-23, 2013 - For the past several weeks there has been intense activity regarding
the situation with H5N1. General press not really involved, but Helen Branswell
(Canadian Press) and Laurie Garrett as well as some bloggers are stoking the flames and
coming up with mischief. USG (NIH/HHS/Amy Patterson) have put together a letter
point-by-point countering the crazy accusations in Mike Osterholm's letter. Big
discussion at HHS/NSS about whether to have Sec. Sebelius officially accept the NSABB
recommendations about publishing the 2 papers. Out of respect for the Dutch, State
Department wants to wait until the April 23-24 meeting of the Dutch for the
announcement. Real circus → White House (Heidi Avery) want us to release the
acceptance now; Dutch are now saying that they may not allow Fouchier to resubmit the
revised manuscript to Science without an export control license; Fouchier says that this is
basic research that is not controlled by export control and so threatens to release it to
Science anyway. He can theoretically face a fine and 6 years in jail. HHS releases
Secretary Sebelius's acceptance on Friday afternoon, April 20; however, in order to halfway not offend the Dutch, they have Francis Collins announce on the NIH Website that
the Secretary has accepted the recommendations of the NSABB to publish without her
actually saying it. Meanwhile, the bloggers (Helen Branswell and others) are accusing
the USG of releasing it on a slow news time (Friday afternoon). I know that this is
clearly not the case since they have been trying to get it out for days, but the bureaucracy
has held it up. I have a Senate Hearing coming up on April 26 where much of this will
get hashed out.
I am getting extremely stressed by all of this since the really bad outcome would be
if biomedical research on dual use issues will be severely impeded by somewhat
hysterical responses to things that really are non-issues. Most of the people (scientists or
not) really do not understand the issues of ferret experiments and their limitations and the
extremely unlikely possibility of a bioterror attack with flu compared to the importance
of doing and communicating science to prepare against the natural emergence of
pandemic influenza.
Just to reiterate, there have been so many aspects of this "perfect storm"
surrounding the manuscripts: 1) Ron Fouchier's original over-selling the scary nature of
this "I have here one of the most dangerous viruses in the world" likely and innocently
trying to push his research and the paper. 2) The NSABB amazingly mis-reading the
papers to believe that the aerosol-transmitted virus actually killed the animals upon
aerosol transmission instead of only after intra-tracheal insertion of 1 million IDs. 3) The
demagoguery of Mike Osterholm and his probable bi-polar hysteria leading the
uninformed NSABB members. 4) The relative lack of influenza expertise of the
NSABB members. 5) The scientific "hubris" of the influenza community, i.e. Peter
Palese who believes (correctly) and says (unfortunately) that the non-influenza people are
clueless. 6) The relative weakness of Paul Keim (good guy) as a Chairperson. 7) The
opportunistic news people (Branswell - Canadian Press and Phil Boffey - NY Times). 8)
The occasional incompetency of Amy Patterson in dealing with the NSABB even though
everyone in the USG thinks that she is doing a great job. 9) The "bioterror-industrial
complex" who sees bioterrorists everywhere and whose jobs depend on the fear of
bioterror (Thomas Ingelsby - think tank; Tara O'Toole - DHS; multiple Beltway bandit
companies, etc.).