Reading Room Production — page 276

De) a 164-06 (received date ated 2ring 1. What information did NIH/NIAID receive, and from whom, that noted a concern for continuing to fund this research? 2. What was the reasoning for NIAID ending the grant and/or collaboration with Ecohealth Alliance? 3. What was communicated to the PI (Dr. Daszak) and/or Ecohealth? Please let me know if you're able to provide this information. Thank you, Ashley Ashley M. Sanders, MPS Supervisor, DPI Program Investigations NIH, OMA, Division Program Integrity 6011 Executive Blvd. Rockville, Maryland 20852 Office: Cell: @nih.gov From: Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E] @nih.gov> Sent: Thursday, May 21, 2020 5:50 PM To: Sanders, Ashley (NIH/OD) [E] @nih.gov>; Linde, Emily (NIH/NIAID) [E] @mail.nih.gov> Cc: Shannon, Mike (NIH/OD) [E] @nih.gov> Subject: RE: Grant Questions - FBI Inquiry - 1-R01AI110964-01 - 2-R01AI110964-06 Hi Ashley, Since we'll only have a short time on Tuesday I thought it might be helpful to provide the agent my responses to the original questions. There may be some misunderstanding of gain-of-function experiments, so hopefully this will clarify some things or at least provide a framework for our discussion next week. Thanks! Erik p.s. I've also pasted the response directly below in case there is an issue adding an attachment to an encrypted message. SF 424 AI110964-06 (received date 11/05/2018) Both SF 424s seem to be describing "gain of function" experiments. On page 192 of SF 424 AI110964-06 (received date 11/05/2018) under P3CO Research, it indicates they are conducting gain of function of SARSr-CoV. The funding pause on gain-of-function (GoF) experiments was in place from 2014-2017, and explicitly involved work reasonably anticipated to enhance the transmissibility or pathogenicity of influenza, MERS-CoV, or SARS-CoV. As such, that policy would not have applied to SARS-related coronaviruses (SARSr-CoV). The replacement policy, Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO), requires additional review and oversight of experiments that are anticipated to increase a potential pandemic pathogen's transmissibility or pathogenicity in humans. The viruses created under this award are chimeric bat viruses, which generally would not be anticipated to cause enhanced disease or transmission in people. When evaluating experiments for potential GoF or P3CO we determine the likelihood of altering one of these attributes compared to the wild-type or circulating viral strain. Were they also conducting Seemless Cloining and Assembly? From a review of their experimental details, it looks as if they were generating recombinant DNA of the viruses using WIV1 as the backbone but I could not determine if they were