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From: "Sanders, Ashley (NIH/OD) [E]" <
@nih.gov>
To: "Miller, David A. (NK) (FBI)" <
@fbi.gov>
Cc: "Stemmy, Erik (NIH/NIAID) [E]" <
@nih.gov>, "Shannon, Mike (NIH/OD) [E]"
<
@nih.gov>
Subject: FW: Grant Questions - FBI Inquiry - 1-R01AI110964-01 - 2-R01AI110964-06
Date: Fri, 22 May 2020 15:17:48 -0400
Importance: Normal
Attachments: SF_424_AI110964.docx
Hi David,
In preparation for our call on Tuesday, Erik (cc'd) has provided responses to your initial questions below (also attached).
Hope you have a great holiday weekend!
Ashley
Ashley M. Sanders, MPS
Senior Program Investigations Officer
NIH, OMA, Division Program Integrity
6011 Executive Blvd.
Rockville, Maryland 20852
Office:
Cell:
@nih.gov
SF 424 AI110964-06 (received date 11/05/2018)
Both SF 424s seem to be describing "gain of function" experiments. On page 192 of SF 424 AI110964-06 (received date
11/05/2018) under P3CO Research, it indicates they are conducting gain of function of SARSr-CoV.
The funding pause on gain-of-function (GoF) experiments was in place from 2014-2017, and explicitly involved work
reasonably anticipated to enhance the transmissibility or pathogenicity of influenza, MERS-CoV, or SARS-CoV. As such, that
policy would not have applied to SARS-related coronaviruses (SARSr-CoV). The replacement policy, Potential Pandemic
Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO), requires additional review and oversight of experiments that are anticipated to
increase a potential pandemic pathogen's transmissibility or pathogenicity in humans. The viruses created under this
award are chimeric bat viruses, which generally would not be anticipated to cause enhanced disease or transmission in
people. When evaluating experiments for potential GoF or P3CO we determine the likelihood of altering one of these
attributes compared to the wild-type or circulating viral strain.
Were they also conducting Seemless Cloining and Assembly? From a review of their experimental details, it looks as if
they were generating recombinant DNA of the viruses using WIV1 as the backbone but I could not determine if they were
using Seemless Cloning techniques.
I'm not aware of them using seamless cloning. Standard techniques for investigators in this field are to create cDNA
molecular clones, which are then expressed in cull culture.
I could not determine exactly where they were conducting these gain of function experiments. I know UNC-Chapel Hill has
done these but within the document, I could not determine where this was occurring. Do you know where this was
occurring?
GoF experiments were not conducted as part of this award. While chimeric viruses were created via this award, they
would not be considered GoF since the results did not confer attributes that were not already exhibited by the wild type
versions of the viruses. For example, expressing the spike protein of SARS-CoV in the WIV-1 backbone did not increase the
pathogenicity of WIV-1 beyond that of SARS-CoV. This award did not support work to manipulate CoV genomes or create
chimeric viruses at Wuhan Institute of Virology; such work was performed at UNC-CH.
It then appears that the recombinant DNA of the virus was then injected into humanized mice. However, again I couldn't
determine where this occurred or was to occur. On page 187 of the same SF 424 under "Vertebrate Animals" it indicates
that work with vertebrate animals will be conducted at Wuhan University at the School of Medicine and UNC - CH. Then
under "Laboratory Mice" it states that lab mice will be sourced commercially by Wuhan Center for Animal Experiment at
Wuhan University and that humanized mice will be bread at University of Wuhan and UNC - CH. Furthermore, the mice
will be inoculated with the virus.
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Records on this page
| Record | Date | Type | Pages |
|---|---|---|---|
| FW: Grant Questions - FBI Inquiry - 1-R01AI110964-01 - 2-R01AI110964-06 | 2020-05-22 | 228–230 |