Gates Package — page 1070

made an attempt at a much larger-scale version of this approach in 2003 with a program called BioWatch, which placed devices designed to detect airborne anthrax, smallpox, and other pathogens in cities throughout the country. Although BioWatch still operates in twenty-two states, it is widely regarded as a flop. Among other faults, it relies on the wind blowing in exactly the right direction and takes up to thirty-six hours to confirm a pathogen. Sometimes the detectors fail to work for the most basic reason--they get unplugged. Regardless of whether air-sniffing machines have a future, the possibility of a bioterror attack is another reason why the world should be putting far more money and effort into research on detecting, treating, and preventing diseases that can go global. Given the national security implications of an attack and the chance that the number of casualties could reach into the millions, more of this research should come from defense budgets. The Pentagon's budget is roughly $600 billion a year, while the National Institutes of Health budget is about $40 billion a year [CHECK THESE FIGURES]. As far as resources are concerned, the Department of Defense operates on a whole other level. Although I'm optimistic that science will deliver better tools for stopping outbreaks from any source, governments should also consider a defense that is as low-tech as they come: a reward. There's precedent for it--governments frequently offer to pay people for information leading to the arrest of criminals and terrorists. Considering the scale of damage that can be done these days, governments should be willing to pay quite a bit to an informant who gave information to thwart a bio-attack.