Diary Prequel Package — page 270

accumulated other mutations besides the original 5 (3 + 2). Ron then did deep sequencing of the transmissible virus and by reverse genetics figured out that you needed the 5 + an additional 4 (now he says less than 4). This was not in the original manuscript (unredacted). White House does not understand that the 5 mutations + Passage = the unpassaged 9 mutations. They fixate about not mentioning the precise 9 mutations when anyone can just take any quasispecies and get a transmissible virus after many passages. You just need a virus and some ferrets. I again am very uncomfortable in asking Ron to hold back this information and told him that this would be his choice and he would have to play it by ear at the meeting, but he will try his best to be vague about the 9. Another ludicrous happening is that this export control issue must also get input from the iPC (interagency Policy Committee) which includes DoD. The night before I am leaving for Geneva (tomorrow on 5:47 PM flight) DoD says that they want to know when I am leaving since they are not sure that I can go since they want the WHO to disinvite the Chinese (where the disease is occurring) since we (USG) do not share restricted information with them. They fail to realize that Margaret Chan (Director General of WHO) is Chinese!!!!! You cannot make this up. DoD is examining this issue tonight and will let me know tomorrow if I can go to Geneva. Feb. 14, 2012 - Approved at the last minute (literally) that I can go to Geneva and was granted an Export Control License for me, Barbara Jasny (representing Bruce Alberts of Science), Paul Keim (Chair, NSABB), and Yoshi Kawaoka (author of Nature article) Feb. 16-17, 2012 - Geneva - Astounding!! During Ron's presentation of the data, I asked the "transforming" question that exposed the confusion that has been propagated regarding the study. It relates to the uncoupling of the issue of aerosol transmission from deadly pathogenesis. Bottom line is that the aerosol-transmitted virus when transmitted to uninfected ferret, not only does not kill them, it does not even cause significant disease. At worst, some mild flu like sxs. See below for my detailed description of the data gathered from the papers, the Geneva presentation together with discussions during the Geneva meeting including a dinner at Keiji's home with Ron, AB Osterhaus, Keiji Fukuda, and Yoshi on the evening of Feb. 15 (more on that later) as well as extensive discussion by phone with Ron after I returned to USA on Feb. 19 and 20, 2012. Recommendation (consensus) of the WHO-convened group was to 1) respect the PIP agreement; 2) extend the voluntary pause ("moratorium") on H5N1 transmissibility/pathogenicity research; 3) Delay publication of the 2 manuscripts until the safety and security issues of such research could be solidified for others. General agreement that the experiments of Yoshi and Ron were carried with safety and security that met or exceeded the guidelines; 4) After meeting conditions in #3, then publish the manuscripts in full; 5) discussion that the publishing of redacted manuscripts with mechanism for vetting and distributing to those with a need to know was completely impractical. This point was fortified by the almost unbelievable and counterintuitive requirements of Export Control Licenses. There was a unanimous recommendation for everything except the recommendation to publish. Nancy Cox did not comment, but Paul Keim and I stood by the recommendations of the NSABB. In the roll-out after the meeting in Geneva, Keiji at first messed up and said that everything was "unanimous consensus", which is an