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Fauci Intelligence Community Release, p.17 · fauci_intel:exh:00005

Page text: p.17 · original PDF

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What is the likely future need for implementation of treaties and other arrangements that will require inspection and verification, and how can DTRA best contribute to this mission? What will likely be the requirements for WMD and related material removal and elimination, in the Former Soviet Union and elsewhere outside the CTR program? What can DTRA contribute to this mission? What is the likely future role of DTRA in addressing the Man Portable Air Defense Systems threat and the elimination of Small Arms and Light Weapons? Protection/Counterproliferation: What are the likely needs and appropriate roles for DTRA's partnership with USSTRATCOM, as well as support to OSD, JCS, other COCOMs and other agencies, for CWMD operations in protectionand counterproliferation in light of today's threats? Emerging threats? What are DTRA's comparative strengths, working with other DoD components, in supporting CWMD operations, including in the area of nuclear detection? What constraints does DTRA face in carrying out its support of What other constraints are likely in the future? Response: What are the DTRA's comparative strengths and appropriate roles, working with other DoD components, in supporting WMD consequence management, and in conducting and assisting others to conduct vulnerability and survivability assessments, within and outside the United States? General: How should DTRA work with its partner USSTRATCOM, as well as with other DoD components, in supporting various CWMD activities, such as training, planning, assessments, exercises, and operations? Do any technology priorities need to be altered to provide more effective support for CWMD operations? How should DTRA alter its strategies and investments for CWMD operations to meet emerging, and future, possibly unforeseen, threats?