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potential CWMD leadership and integration roles. The review will not focus directly on research and development activities. However, it may, in the context of the broader examination of CWMD programs and opportunities, offer recommendations on new or different emphases in research and development. Approach The review is to be completed by the end of February 2008. The panel will have expertise in a range of areas associated with CWMD and related issues. Former Under Secretary of State, Ambassador Robert Joseph and former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Dr. Ashton Carter will co-chair the panel. Dr. Susan Koch will be a member and will take the lead in writing the report. The panel will meet in four or five sessions beginning August 31. At the first session, to be held at DTRA HQ, the panel will address with DTRA officials organizational matters and the structure of the report. At the second and third sessions, the panel will talk with independent and government experts. At a concluding session, the panel will complete its report, including recommendations. The panel will seek consensus recommendations but separate views may be added. The report and recommendations will be submitted to the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC), as well as to OSD Policy, OSD Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the United States Strategic Command. To facilitate quick access to participants, DTRA will arrange consultancy status for those members of the panel who wish them. As part-time consultants, participants will not need formal vetting required of personnel who participate ina FACA Advisory Committee, such as the TRAC. Questions to be Addressed Prevention/Nonproliferation: What are the appropriate roles for DTRA in situational awareness? What are DTRA's advantages in this area, compared to other DoD components, the Intelligence Community, and other agencies, e.g., HHS for biodefense awareness? What are appropriate future contributions, both substantive and geographic, of CTR and other programs to eliminate and control WMD, related materials and delivery systems in permissive environments worldwide? To what extent, and with what priority, should these programs be expanded outside of the former Soviet Union?