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08, 2003 9:15 AM To: _ [III Ghealthtechnetwork.com'; I @saic.com'; NII @mailrockefeller edu'; INI @johnstonde.com'; IN| @sri.ora'; ec TE ci; TE cho 3. Mess. <c Ons hatamu.e Hicunn. fauci@niaid.nih.gov'; co or. 1; Subject: __ Review of the DoD Chem/Bio Program Direction Dr Dale Klein, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological has asked the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee to review the DoD Chemical and Biological program direction to include focus, organization and needed personnel qualifications. We are planning to meet on 1 October for this purpose. I apologize for the short notice but feel we need to get started as soon as practical. We will meet in Washington, probably at IDA. Please let me know as soon as possible if you can participate on that date. To: "Fauci, Anthony (NIH/NIAID)" <AFAUCI@niaid.nih.gov>, "La Montagne, John (NIH/NIAID)" HR @ viaia.nin.gov> Subject: NAS Report on Advances in Biotechnology Date: Fri, 21 Nov 2003 17:57:21 -0500 Importance: Normal Attachments: Bioweapons.pdf Dear Dr. Fauci and John: This may be helpful for the meeting on Monday with the Center for International Security Studies/U.Maryland. al Messag lay, November 13, 2003 6:33 PM I@stanford.edu @danforthcenter.org: @petkevich.com; illy.com; @mail.utexas.edu; @seas.ucla.edu; I@DET.AMEDD.ARMY.MIL; mil; To Alll: Some of you may have received a hardcopy in the mail of the final unclassified version of the meeting report from the January workshop on "new BW". Unfortunately, we were only able to mail to those who provided us with a business address. However, I have been able to obtain a fully electronic version of the report, suitable for emailing, which I attach here. Thank you all for your forbearance and patience in waiting for the report. You are likely unable to imagine the lengthy editing, vetting and approval process which each agency document must undergo. That, in addition to the overwhelming press of daily business, made it hard to get the document out to you in a more timely fashion. In any event, I thank you again for your expertise in helping us to address and better formulate this very critical issue. Best regards, . Analys' T DIOTVSAG UNCLASSIFIED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE The Darker Bioweapons Future A panel of life science experts convened for the Strategic Assessments Group by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that advances in biotechnology, coupled with the difficulty in detecting nefarious biological activity, have the potential to create a much more dangerous biological warfare (BW) threat. The panel noted: ¢ The effects of some of these engineered biological agents could be worse than any disease known to man. e The genomic revolution is pushing biotechnology into an explosive growth phase. Panelists asserted that the resulting wave front of knowledge will evolve rapidly and be so broad, complex, and widely available to the public that traditional intelligence means for monitoring WMD development could prove inadequate to deal with the threat from these advanced biological weapons. e Detection of related activities, particularly the development of novel bioengineered pathogens, will depend increasingly on more specific human intelligence and, argued panelists, will necessitate a closer--and perhaps qualitatively different-- working relationship between the intelligence and biological sciences communities. The Threat From Advanced BW In the last several decades, the world has witnessed a knowledge explosion in the life sciences based on an understanding of genes and how they work. According to panel members, practical applications of this new and burgeoning knowledge base will accelerate dramatically and unpredictably: e As one expert remarked: "In the life sciences, we now are where information technology was in the 3 November 2003 1960s: more than any other science, it will revolutionize the 21" century." Growing understanding of the complex biochemical pathways that underlie life processes has the potential to enable a class of new, more virulent biological agents engineered to attack distinct biochemical pathways and elicit specific effects, claimed panel members. The same science that may cure some of our worst diseases could be used to create the world's most frightening weapons. The know-how to develop some of these weapons already exists. For example: e Australian researchers recently inadvertently showed that the virulence of mousepox virus can be significantly enhanced by the incorporation of a standard immunoregulator gene, a technique that could be applied to other naturally occurring pathogens such as anthrax or smallpox, greatly increasing their lethality. e Indeed, other biologists have synthesized a key smallpox viral protein and shown its effectiveness in blocking critical aspects of the human immune response. e A team of biologists recently created a polio virus in vitro from scratch. According to the scientists convened, other classes of unconventional pathogens that may arise over the next decade and beyond include binary BW agents that only become effective when two components are combined (a particularly insidious example would be a mild pathogen that when combined with its antidote becomes virulent); "designer" BW agents created to