--- type: Person title: Chase Crawford description: Person appearing in 14 documents. tags: - person - niaid organization: niaid document_count: 14 first_seen: "2024-09-25T13:45:00" last_seen: "2024-10-11T12:20:00" aliases: - Chase Crawford sources: - { id: reading_room, resource: /sources/reading-room.md, title: Reading Room Production, author: "process:senate-hsgac-release" } generated: { by: randpaul-corpus-pipeline/1.0, at: "2026-08-01T12:42:27Z" } status: stable --- Appears in the COVID-19 subpoena corpus. # Activity - **Documents:** 14 (sent/authored 14, received 0) - **Active:** 2024-09-25 to 2024-10-11 - **Organization:** [niaid](/organizations/niaid.md) # Correspondents | Person | Messages | First | Last | |---|---:|---|---| | [Robert Eiss](/people/robert-eiss.md) | 14 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-10-11 | | [Michael Nealy](/people/michael-nealy.md) | 10 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-09-30 | | [Courtney Billet](/people/courtney-billet.md) | 9 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-09-30 | | [Emily Erbelding](/people/emily-erbelding.md) | 9 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-09-30 | | [Hugh Auchincloss](/people/hugh-auchincloss.md) | 9 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-09-30 | | [Jill Harper](/people/jill-harper.md) | 9 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-09-30 | | [Marie Parker](/people/marie-parker.md) | 9 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-09-30 | | [Christopher Hanson](/people/christopher-hanson.md) | 8 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-09-30 | | [Ddsm Correspondences](/people/ddsm-correspondences.md) | 8 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-09-30 | | [Kelly Poe](/people/kelly-poe.md) | 8 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-09-30 | | [Sharon Gilles](/people/sharon-gilles.md) | 8 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-09-30 | | [Steven Holland](/people/steven-holland.md) | 8 | 2024-09-25 | 2024-09-30 | # Topics * [Congressional oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md) - 12 documents * [Awards, honoraria and recognition](/topics/awards-honoraria.md) - 6 documents * [Biosafety and biosecurity](/topics/biosafety.md) - 6 documents * [EcoHealth Alliance funding and grants](/topics/ecohealth-funding.md) - 6 documents * [Gain-of-function research](/topics/gain-of-function.md) - 6 documents * [Public comments and policy process](/topics/public-comments-policy.md) - 6 documents # Statement timeline What this person is recorded saying, in date order, quoted verbatim with page citations. * **2024-09-25** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), reports): "This morning, the attached version of the bill was reported out of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) and now awaits further Senate consideration." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-25** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), reports): "This morning, the attached version of the bill was reported out of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs (HSGAC) and now awaits further Senate consideration." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "Thanks, Chase NIAID NIAID notes that, to avoid confusion, the definitions in the bill pertaining to scientific and/or current policies should be consistent with definitions in science and those policies, including the USG Policy for Oversight of DURC and…" [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([gain_of_function](/topics/gain-of-function.md), asserts): "ORS Concern over the confusion and differences between agent listing, some definition and intent of this as compared to the new DURC PEPP policy and also the current/ transparent process by which select agents are added or removed." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([gain_of_function](/topics/gain-of-function.md), asserts): "We would recommend alignment 100% in line with the current SA policies and DURC PEPP policies." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "We have significant concerns about this bill and approach this would take for the oversight of biological research." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "OSP Topline points: · While some aspects of this bill related to scope are improved, there continue to be significant concerns about the impact on biomedical research. · Strengthening biosafety and biosecurity oversight of life sciences research is a key…" [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "We believe the bill as drafted would significantly undermine life sciences research, and its oversight provisions fail to target the subset of research posing greatest risk." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "As such, we do not support this legislation. · The Administration has recently strengthened, streamlined, and expanded oversight of potentially high risk life science research in the May 2024 United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research…" [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "Some of our concerns with the bill are: · Scope: While steps have been made toward harmonization of the scope of the Board's oversight with the new United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced…" [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "Thanks, Chase NIAID NIAID notes that, to avoid confusion, the definitions in the bill pertaining to scientific and/or current policies should be consistent with definitions in science and those policies, including the USG Policy for Oversight of DURC and…" [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([gain_of_function](/topics/gain-of-function.md), asserts): "ORS Concern over the confusion and differences between agent listing, some definition and intent of this as compared to the new DURC PEPP policy and also the current/ transparent process by which select agents are added or removed." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([gain_of_function](/topics/gain-of-function.md), asserts): "We would recommend alignment 100% in line with the current SA policies and DURC PEPP policies." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "We have significant concerns about this bill and approach this would take for the oversight of biological research." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "Strengthening biosafety and biosecurity oversight of life sciences research is a key priority of this Administration, as outlined in the National Biodefense Strategy." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "We believe the bill as drafted would significantly undermine life sciences research, and its oversight provisions fail to target the subset of research posing greatest risk." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "The Administration has recently strengthened, streamlined, and expanded oversight of potentially high risk life science research in the May 2024 United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic…" [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([gain_of_function](/topics/gain-of-function.md), asserts): "The bill seems to create redundancies with some reforms recently introduced by the DURC/PEPP policy, which was developed following significant interagency discussions directed by Congress and informed by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity,…" [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "For example, we would welcome discussions on how the risk-based oversight processes established in the DURC policy for federally funded research could be extended to non-federally funded research." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "We recognize that biosafety and biosecurity oversight responsibilities are currently shared across many different departments and agencies and welcome discussions on appropriate entities for oversight of the highest risk research." [^reading_room] * **2024-09-30** ([congressional_oversight](/topics/congressional-oversight.md), asserts): "Some of our concerns with the bill are: Scope: While steps have been made toward harmonization of the scope of the Board's oversight with the new United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced…" [^reading_room] # Sources [^reading_room]: [reading_room](/sources/reading-room.md)